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LAST EXIT
Privatization and Deregulation of 
the U.S. Transportation System
In Last Exit Clifford Winston reminds us that transportation services and infra-
structure in the United States were originally introduced by private firms. The
case for subsequent public ownership and management of the system was
weak, in his view, and here he assesses the case for privatization and deregu-
lation to greatly improve Americans’ satisfaction with their transportation
  systems.
“A half-century of economics research, much of it from Brookings, convincingly
shows that deregulation of transportation services delivered enormous benefits.
Last Exit argues persuasively that these benefits are limited by continuing pub-
lic provision of infrastructure and regulation or public provision of some services.
Clifford Winston proposes experiments in private provision of airports, high-
ways, and urban passenger transportation, and more efficient usage pricing for
infrastructure, to test the strong theoretical case for increasing the scope of pri-
vatization and deregulation. These provocative but measured proposals provide
the agenda for a serious national debate on the next steps in reforming trans-
portation policy.”—Roger Noll, Stanford University
“Clifford Winston offers a blueprint for increasing the role of the private sector
in providing U.S. transportation infrastructure. He makes the case that public
sector exit can improve economic efficiency, speed technological advance, and
help solve current fiscal pressures.”—Betsy Bailey, University of Pennsylvania
“Winston pulls together the first comprehensive accounting of the many ineffi-
ciencies that arise from current public policies in transportation. The bill—
amounting to $100 billion per year plus reduced innovation—will hopefully
stimulate some of the experiments he advocates with increased private provi-
sion of transportation.”—Tony Gomez-Ibanez, Harvard University
Clifford Winston is a senior fellow in Economic Studies at the Brookings
  Institution. His previous books include Aviation Infrastructure Performance and
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1
Back to the Future to Improve 
U.S. Transportation
The philosophy of one century is the common sense of the next.
Henry Ward Beecher
From ocean voyages to flights into outer space, new ways of traveling 
generate excitement because they expand opportunities for travelers to visit 
faraway places and to reach their destinations faster. Today, Americans’ inter-
est in new travel options has been piqued by the possibility of high-speed rail 
service that exceeds 300 miles an hour and by supersonic air service that does 
little damage to the environment. At the same time, most travelers would be 
ecstatic if they could drive on well-maintained roads at posted speed limits 
during rush hours, fly on airplanes that arrived at their destinations on time, 
and commute on buses and subways that provided safe, reliable, and clean 
service. Instead they are frustrated by a variety of problems with the nation’s 
transportation system and disillusioned with public officials who seem inca-
pable of enacting policies that will improve their travel experiences.
Historically, the private sector developed and operated new modes of 
commercial passenger and freight transportation in the United States and 
built transportation equipment and infrastructure. Those accomplishments 
were brought about by some of the nation’s greatest business leaders, who 
were attracted to the transportation sector. According to the Harvard Busi-
ness School’s compilation of 1,000 Great American Business Leaders of the 
Twentieth Century, encompassing twenty-one industry classifications, 102 
were leaders of transportation service companies (airlines and railways) or 
transportation manufacturing companies (automobiles and aerospace).1
1. For the complete list, see www.hbs.edu/leadership/database.
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Wright and Murphy (2009) compiled data indicating that by 1860 at least 
7,000 private U.S. corporations had formed to operate bridges, canals, fer-
ries, railroads, and roads. Total private capital investment in those transpor-
tation facilities and services amounted to roughly $3 billion (in 1860 dollars), 
a significant share of the gross domestic product (GDP).2 Most government 
investment in transportation was in local bridges, roads, and, in some states, 
canals. Klein and Majewski (2006) report that cumulative private sector 
investment in turnpike construction from 1800 to 1830 in New England and 
Middle Atlantic states amounted to 6.2 percent of those states’ 1830 GDP. By 
comparison, spending between 1956 and 1995 by all levels of government to 
build the Dwight D. Eisenhower National System of Interstate and Defense 
Highways amounted to 4.3 percent of 1996 GDP.
Over  time,  however,  all  levels  of  government  became  increasingly 
involved in regulating, and in some cases operating and owning, transpor-
tation modes and infrastructure. The trend culminated in the post–World 
War II period with the creation of the federal Interstate Highway System. In 
the late 1970s, as part of a broader movement away from government inter-
vention in the economy, the pendulum began to swing back when Congress 
partially deregulated most intercity transportation services. Since then, poli-
cymakers have pursued “partnerships” with the private sector in an effort to 
raise funds to maintain highways and airports and to build new transporta-
tion infrastructure. In essence, the United States has been trying to find an 
optimal mix of public and private sector involvement in transportation since 
its founding.
Do the current problems with the transportation system suggest that the 
nation should find a new stable equilibrium that will persist indefinitely? 
The unequivocal answer in this book is yes—namely, by designing experi-
ments, which if successful, could take the United States back to the future by 
privatizing and deregulating the vast majority of the transportation system 
and by reducing the government’s primary role in this sector to mitigating 
externalities, such as emissions, and to enforcing the antitrust laws.
I am not prepared to unconditionally call for privatization and deregula-
tion because such a major change in public policy is likely to create good and 
bad unintended consequences. Accordingly, I recommend trying the pol-
icy in a few places to see what happens before implementing it nationwide. 
2. Wright and Murphy (2009) note that $1 billion was a significant amount of money in 
the first half of the nineteenth century. As a relative share of GDP, $1 billion in 1860 was worth 
approximately $3.2 trillion in 2007.
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Policymakers should select transportation services in certain locales that 
are provided by the public sector, allow private firms to innovate in those 
services, and respond according to the results. By producing greater under-
standing of how market forces could allocate transportation resources, the 
experiments could guide widespread implementation of and justification for 
a new approach to transportation policy that could significantly improve the 
system’s performance.
To be sure, it will take time and careful analysis for such a bold proposal 
to gain support among the public and policymakers and to be properly 
implemented. But addressing the anticipated political resistance and intel-
lectual challenge to launching experiments will ultimately strengthen their 
design and improve their long-run chances for success. By developing an 
initial overview of the economic case for privatizing and deregulating the 
transportation system, I hope to show that fundamental policy reform is 
essential for ridding the system of its vast and intractable inefficiencies that 
have accumulated under decades of public sector management and control.
The Stakes: Transportation in the U.S. Economy
Automobiles and jet aircraft are commonly listed among the greatest human 
inventions of all time,3 while the U.S. road system represents the nation’s 
largest civilian public investment, valued at $2.4 trillion in 2006.4
These and other transportation inventions and investments have contrib-
uted significantly to U.S. economic growth by enabling firms to expand the 
size and scope of their markets. For example, if a more efficient road system 
enables a firm to serve regional markets as well as local ones, then the firm 
can improve its efficiency by realizing greater economies of scale, economies 
of scope (multiproduct production), and economies of multiplant opera-
tions. In addition, the improved road system can enable a firm to reduce its 
inventories because it receives faster and more reliable shipments of inter-
mediate goods, to reduce its input costs, and to improve labor productiv-
ity by expanding its choice of workers and a worker’s choice of employers. 
Households also gain by being better able to optimize their residential and 
workplace locations. And by reducing the costs of international trade, an 
improved road system further expands firms’ markets and increases con-
sumer welfare.
3. See, for example, www.greatachievements.org.
4. Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce (www.bea.gov/). 
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In a conventional economic growth model where technological change 
raises the standard of living, transportation can be characterized as improv-
ing the technology firms use to produce and distribute their products and 
services. Indeed Krugman (2009) argues that the railroads contributed to 
a fundamental change in the U.S. economy—differentiating it into a farm 
belt and a manufacturing belt—by decreasing transportation costs. Trans-
portation also promotes agglomeration economies that facilitate pooling 
labor and transferring information and ideas in metropolitan areas, which 
are additional sources of economic growth (Glaeser and Gottlieb 2009; Jones 
and  Romer  2010).  An  inefficient  urban  transportation  system  results  in 
sprawl that can limit agglomeration economies.
Unfortunately, a precise estimate of how much the U.S. transportation 
system contributes to the nation’s economic growth is difficult to obtain. 
Denison (1985) constructed estimates of the determinants of growth and 
concluded that the gains from economies of scale, which as noted are largely 
facilitated by transportation, accounted for nearly 11 percent of the annual 
growth rate of national income in nonresidential business from 1929 to 1982. 
Some transportation case studies have found that metropolitan employment 
growth is promoted by greater airport activity (Brueckner 2003; Green 2006) 
and by additions to the highway capital stock (Duranton and Turner 2008).
Transportation’s importance to the U.S. economy is more clearly indi-
cated by its large share of economic activity, as measured by its share of GDP. 
As shown in table 1-1, in 2006 American consumers spent roughly $1.1 tril-
lion commuting to work, traveling for pleasure, and buying and operating 
vehicles. Firms spent roughly $1 trillion shipping products to distribution 
centers and retail outlets, sending their employees to meet with customers 
and suppliers, and buying and operating vehicles (spending by firms on their 
employees’ travel is included with consumers’ transportation services). Local, 
state, and federal government spending on transportation infrastructure and 
services contributed $256 billion and upped total spending on transporta-
tion to more than $2.3 trillion, or roughly 17.5 percent of 2006 GDP.
Transportation also requires users to expend their time—a valuable com-
modity excluded from GDP. Table 1-1 indicates that in 2007 travelers spent 
roughly 175 billion hours in transit, and commodities shipped by surface and 
air freight absorbed 25.6 billion ton-days in transit. To convert those transit 
times into dollar figures, I assume that travelers value time at half their hourly 
wage (Small and Verhoef 2007 indicate that this is a reasonable assumption) 
and that shippers attach a cost of 7 percent of their shipments’ value for each 
additional day spent in transit—a figure that is bounded by Winston and 
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Table 1-1.  Total Expenditures of Money and Time on Transportation 







(billions of 2007 $)
Consumers
(175.61 billion hours multiplied by  
half of the hourly wage, $8.69)
Motor vehicles and parts $434.2
Gasoline and oil $318.6a
Transportation services $340.6
  Total $1,093.4b $762.8c
Firms (25.6 billion ton-days multiplied  
by the avg. value per ton of $1,213  
discounted by 7% per day)
Shipping goods $829.6 
Vehicles and maintenance $179.7 




State and local $208.9
Defense $14.8
  Total $256.0f
    Grand total $2,358.7  $2,935.1
a. To avoid double counting, gasoline and oil should be net of federal and state taxes, which 
support government spending on transportation. I could not verify that such taxes were excluded 
in consumer expenditures on gasoline and oil. If they were not, they amount to roughly $50 billion 
based on 2006 federal taxes and a weighted average of state taxes. 
b. “Transportation services” includes both purchased urban commuting transportation as well 
as purchased intercity transportation, which includes business-related travel. Source: Bureau of 
Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts, Table 2.3.5, Personal Consumption 
Expenditures by Major Type of Product (Q1 2008). 
c. The time that people spend in transit is based on calculations of time in transit for short-
distance trips and trips of more than fifty miles, both based on National Household Travel Survey 
(NHTS) 2001 data, the most recent year for which data are available. For short-distance trips, a 
constant breakdown of travel time per trip in minutes (for example, trips of 0–4 min, 5–9 min, 
and so forth) between 2001 and 2007 is assumed (based on evidence of this constant relationship 
between data published in 1995 and 2001). Total annual short-distance person trips for 2007 are 
estimated based on historical year-on-year percentage increases in these person trips per capita. 
To estimate the number of hours that travelers spend in single-day travel on short trips, I dis-
tribute that number of 2007 person trips by the breakdown (averaged between the 1995 and 2001 
NHTS) of travel time per trip. Because the only data collected on long-distance passenger travel 
were published in 1995 and 2001, and because the 1995 and 2001 numbers are not directly com-
parable and a projected year-on-year growth rate cannot be calculated, it is necessary to assume 
that   long-distance passenger trips grew at the same rate as short-distance person trips. It is then 
(continued)
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also necessary to assume that the ratio of passenger miles to passenger trips remained constant 
through 2007 in order to calculate person miles based on projections of growth in person trips. 
Furthermore, it is also necessary to assume that the same percentage breakdown of these long-
distance trips by transportation mode holds from 1995 and 2001. For each of the transportation 
modes, person hours traveled are calculated assuming constant average speeds for each mode. 
Mode categories “water” and “other” are disregarded because average speeds are not obvious and 
their contribution to the total is minimal. Finally, to calculate the value of person hours traveled 
in total, for both short- and long-distance trips, total hours are multiplied by half of the average 
hourly wage based on a forty-hour workweek.  Sources: National Household Travel Survey (1995 
and 2001); Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS) Table 1-39, Long Distance Travel in the U.S. 
(2001); BTS American Travel Survey, Travel in the United States, Table 1 (1995); U.S. Census, 
Average Weekly Wage (2007). 
d. The expenditures of firms on transportation are calculated based on components: expen-
ditures on shipping goods, and expenditures related to vehicles and maintenance. Expenditures 
on shipping goods are calculated from BTS data on total freight transportation expenditures. 
The most recent year for which data on these expenditures are available at the time of writing is 
2001. Year 2006 numbers are therefore a forward projection based on average historical year-on-
year percentage growth rates adjusted for inflation.  Expenditures on vehicles and maintenance 
are calculated from BTS data on total gross private domestic investment for 2006 and con-
firmed by similar data from BEA. Sources: BTS Table 3-7, Passenger and Freight Transportation 
Expenditures (2001); BTS Table 3-3a, U.S. Gross Domestic Demand Attributed to Transportation 
Related Final Demand (2006); BEA National Income and Product Accounts, Table 5.5.5, Private 
Fixed Investment in Equipment and Software by Type (2008). 
e. Time expenditure in transportation for firms is based on calculations made for freight 
ton-miles by transportation mode from BTS data. Year 2005 is the most recent year for which 
freight ton–mile data are available; therefore historical average year-on-year percent increases 
were calculated between 1985 and 2005 in order to project forward to 2007. Average speeds 
based on freight transportation modes were assumed, taking into account wait times, especially 
important for rail and waterborne freight. For waterborne freight in particular, average speeds 
are segmented based on where the travel was conducted (open ocean, Great Lakes, and the like). 
Furthermore, the total number of hauls is calculated for waterborne freight based on average 
haul length, to which one additional day per haul is added to reflect wait times at port loading 
and unloading freight. Again, because data on average haul length were last published in 2005, a 
projection to 2006 is made using an average historical year-on-year percent increase. Across all 
modes, total ton-miles per day were calculated based on the assumed average speeds by mode 
and any added wait times. Using year 1993, 1997, and 2002 freight value data, a projection 
for total 2007 freight value is again made based on historical year-on-year percent increases. 
Average ton-value is constructed from this total freight value and total freight tonnage. Finally 
this average ton-value is discounted by 7 percent for every ton-day in transit. Sources: BTS 
Table 1-46b, U.S. Ton Miles of Freight (BTS Special Tabulation) (2005); BTS Commercial Freight 
Activity in the United States by Mode of Transportation: 1993, 1997, 2002 (2002); BTS Commodity 
Flow Survey (1993, 1997, 2002); BTS Table 1-35, Average Length of Haul, Domestic Freight and 
Passenger Modes (2005).
f. Federal and state and local expenditures are a summation of government consumption 
expenditures for the following component categories; highways, air, water, and transit and 
railroad. Defense expenditures combine expenditures on transportation of materials and travel 
of persons. Sources: BTS Table 3-3a, U.S. Gross Domestic Demand Attributed to Transportation 
Related Final Demand (2006); BEA, National Economic Accounts, Table 3.15.5, Government 
Consumption Expenditures and Gross Investment by Function (2006).
Table 1-1 (continued)
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Langer’s (2006) daily discount rates for shipments of bulk and perishable 
commodities. The result is that transportation accounts for another $2.9 tril-
lion in economic activity for a grand total of roughly $5 trillion!5
Finally, transportation’s influence extends beyond the nation’s borders. 
In this era of globalization, international trade—whose share of U.S. GDP 
has grown to more than 15 percent—is facilitated by ocean and Great Lakes 
transportation and by trucks and railroads that carry freight to and from 
the nation’s ports. International passenger and freight air traffic is inter-
twined with the domestic system. And as a major source of greenhouse 
gases, transportation is at the center of the global challenges presented by 
climate change.6 The United States and other countries face the challenge 
of simultaneously reducing their emissions and improving the efficiency of 
their transportation systems to facilitate the projected growth in domestic 
and international trade and travel.
Certain government regulations and expenditures appear to single out 
transportation as the lifeblood of the U.S. economy. For instance, Congress 
passed the Railway Labor Act in 1926 and later amended it in 1936 to force 
airline and railroad workers to resolve labor disputes by engaging in arbi-
tration  instead  of  significantly  disrupting  interstate  commerce  by  going 
on strike. The federal government’s recent investments in transportation 
infrastructure and services have been a critical component of the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (popularly known as the stimulus 
bill) to spur the nation’s growth. Against this background, it is useful to 
understand how the public sector came to manage, regulate, and operate so 
much of the system.
The Evolution of Public Sector Involvement
A capsule history of the major U.S. transportation modes and infrastruc-
ture suggests that all levels of government have tended to expand—and only 
recently partly withdraw—their control over transportation infrastructure 
and services in response to major economic problems. In general, government 
intervention in transportation increased because of exigent circumstances 
5. To provide a fair comparison of this estimate with the value of all U.S. economic activity, 
one would need to estimate the value of time that individuals spend in all of their activities and 
include that figure in GDP. 
6. Jack Short reports that the transport sector accounts for nearly one-quarter of global car-
bon dioxide emissions from fuel combustion and that this share is growing. See “Transport and 
Energy: The Challenge of Climate Change,” OECD Observer (March 2008), pp. 20–21. 
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created by private firms’ financial crises and not because of well-developed 
conceptual arguments that justified greater public sector involvement. In 
addition, as I note later, government regulations often contributed to those 
crises, and public officials made little effort to help private firms survive. In 
any event, I do not attempt to resolve whether government’s greater role fol-
lowing the initial development of each component of the transportation sys-
tem was justified, but I do develop the case that the system’s evolution with 
greater public sector involvement has caused it to accumulate inefficiencies 
that will take decades to shed.
Roads
The first roads in the United States were built by private enterprises; the 
most important of these were turnpike companies that received a franchise 
from a state to build, operate, and maintain roads and bridges. State charters 
specified organizing procedures, capitalization, and par value of stock, and 
state legislatures set toll policies. During the nineteenth century more than 
3,000 private companies operated toll roads.7 Some of the turnpikes were 
macadamized or planked and employed grading on steep hills to aid travel 
for heavier (nonmotorized) vehicles.
States became more involved in roads as private turnpikes failed finan-
cially for various reasons, including generous state-granted toll exemptions, 
rigid toll rates, severe toll evasion problems (Klein and Fielding 1992), and 
overly optimistic forecasts of how long wooden planks would last (Klein and 
Majewski 1988). Federal involvement in the nation’s roads can be traced to 
the U.S. Constitution, which gave Congress the power to establish post offices 
and post roads. The 1916 Rural Post Roads Act authorized federal grants to 
pay for up to half the costs of constructing rural roads used to deliver the 
mail. Initially, federal highway programs were financed entirely from general 
revenues. In 1932 the federal government imposed a tax on gasoline fuel, the 
revenue from which was formally earmarked for highway programs when 
the Highway Trust Fund was created in 1956 (Burch 1962). Major federal 
transportation legislation in later decades significantly increased the size of 
the trust fund and federal highway expenditures.8 With few exceptions, fed-
eral funding programs have favored public ownership and operation, while 
7. Klein and Majewski (2006) and Klein and Fielding (1992) provide concise histories of 
private toll roads. 
8. Oregon passed the nation’s first tax on gasoline, 1 cent a gallon, in 1919. Ten years later, all 
forty-eight states had imposed gasoline taxes that ranged from 1 to 3 cents a gallon. 
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interest groups representing state and local officials, such as the National 
Governors Association and the U.S. Conference of Mayors, have lobbied for 
increased flexibility in the use of those funds.
Airports
Private airports, some of which were owned by airlines, were the first air-
ports in the United States. By 1912 twenty airports were in use through-
out the country (Wells 1996). Municipally owned airports emerged in those 
communities that were eager to be connected with the rest of the country. 
During the Great Depression, private commercial airports experienced seri-
ous financial problems and were taken over by local or state governments. It 
is possible that some private commercial airports could have survived with 
temporary public assistance and that private airport competition could have 
developed as the demand for air travel grew in subsequent decades, but the 
Federal Aviation Administration prohibited private airports from offering 
commercial service after it was established in 1958 (see below).
The Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 paved the way for federal funding of 
airports by authorizing funds to build additional airfields (Dilger 2003). 
Federal funding subsequently evolved and led to the creation of the Airport 
and Airway Trust Fund. The trust fund is composed of revenues from avia-
tion excise taxes, fuel taxes, and other similar revenue sources and is used 
to finance the Federal Aviation Administration’s Airport Improvement Pro-
gram, which disburses funds to airports of all sizes.
Air Traffic Control
The first air traffic control system in the United States appears to have been 
developed in 1935 by the principal airlines using the Chicago, Cleveland, 
and Newark airports. The airlines agreed to coordinate monitoring of air-
line traffic between those cities and opened the first Airway Traffic Control 
Center in Newark, followed by the establishment of centers in Chicago and 
Cleveland.
Private air traffic control soon ceased because of the financial pressures 
brought  on  by  the  Great  Depression.  The  federal  government  became 
involved with air traffic control in 1936, providing en route service, while 
municipal government authorities operated the towers at airports. In the 
wake of increasing air traffic and a well-publicized June 1956 midair col-
lision  between  long-distance  United  Airlines  and  TWA  flights  over  the 
Grand Canyon, Congress passed the Federal Aviation Act in 1958, which 
gave responsibility for managing the nation’s navigable airspace to the new 
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Federal Aviation Agency (renamed the Federal Aviation Administration in 
1967, when it was brought into the newly established U.S. Department of 
Transportation). Financial support for the air traffic control system comes 
from airline ticket tax revenues that go into the Airport and Airway Trust 
Fund and from general revenues.
Urban Transit
The first urban rail systems in the United States—built by private companies 
in Boston in 1898 and in New York City in 1904—were given charters by 
those cities’ governments to establish rights-of-way. Private companies also 
operated the first urban motor buses in the nation. Transit fares and routes 
were subject to regulation by local or state authorities.
The advent of the automobile put many transit operations under bank-
ruptcy court supervision by the late 1920s. During the 1940s and 1950s, city 
governments gradually took over private intracity bus and rail systems as 
intense competition from the automobile accelerated the decline in transit 
ridership. But Pashigian (1976) and Hilton (1985), among others, argued 
that private operators could have succeeded (as they have in other countries) 
if regulatory constraints had not seriously hampered their financial perfor-
mance. Pashigian concluded that regulation was simply an intervening step 
to facilitate public ownership. By the 1960s city officials called on the federal 
government to help support urban transit on the grounds that it would stim-
ulate urban renewal. Thus the 1961 Housing Act and the 1964 Urban Mass 
Transportation Act gave cities money to buy most of the remaining private 
transit companies and signaled the start of major federal funding of bus and 
rail capital expenditures.
Taxis and Jitneys
Taxi and jitney service has always been provided by the private sector. Gas-
powered taxicabs began operating in eastern U.S. cities at the beginning of 
the twentieth century. Regulation of taxicabs evolved from setting safety 
standards to governing fares, entry, routes, and schedules. Such regulations 
are not uniform throughout the country; in fact, twenty or so urban areas 
have deregulated taxi operations (Winston and Shirley 1998).
Jitneys occupy a niche between a taxi and a bus. They typically are small-
capacity vehicles that follow a rough service route but can go out of their 
way to pick up and drop off passengers. Jitney service was first offered in the 
United States in Los Angeles in 1914. But jitneys never blossomed as a mode 
nationwide because regulations, often demanded by streetcar companies, 
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compromised service. Today jitneys operate in a handful of mainly inner-
city areas, subject to regulations on fares and service.
Intercity Transportation
With the exception of Amtrak and Conrail, commercial U.S. railroads, motor 
carriers, buses, pipelines, airlines, and water carriers have been owned and 
operated by private firms, but over time they have been subject to varying 
degrees of federal and state economic regulation as dictated, in large part, by 
political forces. With the support of rail carriers and farmers, railroads were 
first regulated by the 1887 Interstate Commerce Act, ostensibly to prevent 
“destructive competition.” Hilton (1966) argued that the act, which cre-
ated the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), was in fact an incorrect 
response to the economic conditions of the time. In 1970 Amtrak was created 
as a public corporation to relieve freight railroads of unprofitable passenger 
service. Amtrak was expected to be financially self-sufficient within a few 
years of its inception and to operate as a private entity without subsidies, but 
nearly forty years later that expectation has not come close to materializing.
Spurred by strong lobbying by railroads fearful of growing motor carrier 
competition, Congress enacted the Motor Carrier Act in 1935 and gave the 
ICC authority to regulate truck rates and entry into markets. The Motor Car-
rier Act also authorized the ICC to regulate fares, routes, entry, and exit of 
interstate bus lines. Individual states had begun to regulate intrastate bus and 
trucking operations at least a decade before the 1935 federal act.
The nation’s petroleum pipelines were subjected to ICC regulation in 
1906, as a reaction to John D. Rockefeller’s alleged use of them to monop-
olize the oil industry. In 1977 interstate regulation of petroleum pipelines 
was transferred to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). As 
the ICC’s successor, the Surface Transportation Board regulates pipelines 
that provide interstate transportation of commodities other than oil, gas, or 
water, such as anhydrous ammonia and coal slurry.
During the airline industry’s infancy, mail contracts enabled passenger ser-
vice to be financially feasible; thus in the 1920s the postmaster general became 
the first regulator of the airlines. The major airlines suffered severe financial 
losses after President Franklin Roosevelt rescinded their airmail route author-
ity when they were charged with colluding to monopolize the nation’s airways. 
By the time any carrier started to show a profit, the entire industry had been 
brought under regulation by the 1938 Civil Aeronautics Act.
Government has intervened in water transportation, including private 
carriers of inland and ocean freight, port terminals and landside access, and 
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navigable waterways, as it has in other forms of transportation. The Trans-
portation Act of 1940 gave the ICC regulatory authority over inland water-
way carriers’ rates and entry, while ocean carriers’ rates and service have been 
determined since 1916 through rate conferences and agreements. Ports were 
originally developed by private investors—mainly shipping companies—but 
subject to regulation by local or regional authorities (Stevens 1999). Mainte-
nance and expansion of navigable channels is performed by the Army Corps 
of Engineers. Expenditures on ports are supported by revenues, placed in a 
trust fund, that are generated by the Harbor Maintenance Tax.
From its inception, economic regulation compromised the efficiency of the 
intercity transportation system while producing few, if any, improvements. 
The 1950s system depicted by Meyer, Peck, Stenason, and Zwick (1959) con-
sisted of railroads that provided poor service and earned a low rate of return, 
airlines that primarily served affluent travelers despite technological advances 
that substantially lowered the costs of air travel, and motor carriers that 
charged rates so high that many shippers found it less costly to operate their 
own trucking service. Intercity buses virtually disappeared from the transpor-
tation system. Scholars argued that the common source of the problems was 
regulation, and some twenty years later policymakers were persuaded to pass 
deregulation legislation, including the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, the 
Motor Carrier Reform Act of 1980, the Staggers Rail Act of 1980, and the 1982 
Bus Regulatory Reform Act. Those acts substantially (but not completely) 
deregulated the U.S. rail, motor carrier, airline, and bus industries.9
9. Air cargo regulations for entry, routes, and rates, which were adopted by the Civil Aero-
nautics Board in 1947, were dismantled by congressional legislation in November 1977. In 1992 
FERC Order No. 636 (referred to as the Final Restructuring Rule) effectively unbundled natural 
gas pipelines to promote competition, but FERC still regulates rates. Shippers can obtain dis-
counts by obtaining “interruptible” service (that is, a pipeline owner can stop service to a cus-
tomer when demand is high under conditions specified by a contract). Shippers can also resell 
surplus pipeline capacity to other entities and negotiate rates for storage, hub, and transporta-
tion service. As part of the ICC Termination Act of 1995, the Surface Transportation Board was 
given authority to regulate inland water carriers subject to a “zone of reasonableness” in which 
a published tariff rate would be deemed reasonable. (Specifically, a tariff rate can be no more 
than 7.5 percent higher or 10 percent lower than it was one year earlier, subject to adjustments 
by the Producer Price Index.) Water carriers may also offer unregulated contract carriage rates. 
In contrast to the deregulatory actions in domestic transportation, international airline travel 
between the United States and some other countries is still subject to bilateral negotiations that 
regulate fares and service. Nearly 100 open-skies agreements have to a varying extent deregu-
lated fares and services on routes between the United States and countries in the European 
Union and in other parts of the world. Fox and White (1997) point out that U.S. ocean freight 
vessels were regulated, protected from foreign competition, and subsidized. The 1998 Ocean 
Shipping Reform Act enables carriers to offer customer-specific shipping services differentiated 
by price and quality.  
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Regulation of urban transportation persists because federal deregulatory 
actions did not affect state or city regulations. But are such regulations justi-
fied? Are intercity and urban transportation sufficiently different from each 
other that the government should continue to be heavily involved with the 
urban system and its infrastructure? Or should the intercity transportation 
deregulation experiment be extended to privatize and deregulate more of the 
U.S. transportation system?
Privatization and Deregulation
Government intervened in a developing urban and intercity transportation 
system that faced different problems than it does today. Regardless of the 
justification for that intervention, most policymakers, transportation pro-
viders, and users have increasingly concluded that the performance of the 
current system is generally unsatisfactory and that government’s traditional 
solution (reinforced by classic political pressure from interest groups) of 
spending our way out of the problems is not a viable option because the 
federal government and most state governments are facing severe fiscal pres-
sures for the foreseeable future.
Privatization and deregulation may appear to be an extreme approach, 
especially given past problems with private provision of certain transpor-
tation services and infrastructure and current doubts about whether mar-
kets can be trusted to deliver essential services. At the same time, govern-
ment failure in transportation has solidified inefficient practices that must 
be purged and has slowed technological advance that must be accelerated. 
Private firms may accomplish those goals if they are not constrained by the 
kinds of regulatory interventions that undermined their initial efforts to 
develop the system.
Potential Benefits
The essential goal of privatization and deregulation of the U.S. transporta-
tion system is to develop market-based institutions that are stimulated by 
competition to respond to customers’ preferences, expand choices, mini-
mize costs, and introduce innovative services and technologies. Privately 
owned enterprises selling services directly to the public are dependent on 
customer goodwill and in contrast to public sector providers less likely to 
have their operations shaped by special interests that substantially raise the 
cost of transportation to the general public.
The evidence I synthesize in subsequent chapters indicates that the annual 
efficiency costs associated with public ownership and (mis)management of 
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the system clearly exceed $100 billion, not including the costs of impedi-
ments to innovation and slow technological advance. Theoretical and lim-
ited empirical arguments suggest that privatization and deregulation could 
significantly eliminate current inefficiencies and spur innovations that are 
difficult to envision in the current environment, but the case would be much 
more persuasive if it were accompanied by evidence obtained from privatiza-
tion experiments in the United States.
Experiments
Federal  regulators  obtained  credible  and  ultimately  influential  advice  to 
significantly withdraw their interventions in intercity transportation from 
evidence based on unregulated intrastate airline markets in California and 
Texas and deregulation of truck rates for certain commodities and from 
empirical studies indicating that intermodal (truck-rail and, in some cases, 
barge-rail) competition could discipline partially deregulated railroad rates 
for most commodities. In fact Derthick and Quirk (1985), Breyer (1982), 
and Levine (1981) argue that intercity transportation deregulation would 
not have occurred without such evidence.
In contrast, it has been argued that the existence of monopoly elements 
in urban transportation (public transit and urban highways), intercity high-
ways, and aviation infrastructure (airports and air traffic control) prevents 
competition from developing and justifies government ownership—or at 
least regulation. Because evidence in the United States is not available to 
address this fundamental concern, policymakers and interested stakehold-
ers should not embark on a privatization and deregulation policy without 
being persuaded that effective competition can develop in those transporta-
tion services to assuage concerns that privatization will simply create private 
monopolies.
Long-term experiments that are carefully conducted by policymakers and 
that allow the economic effects of privatization to fully develop could provide 
the essential evidence. Such experiments may be compelling to policymakers 
in this recessionary climate because they may lead to greater private sector 
involvement in transportation that could improve government budgets and 
lead to innovations that spur economic growth. For example, privatization 
of a major highway would be expected to create a monopoly. But the theory 
of dynamic monopoly suggests that Coasian bargaining between road users 
who are represented by a third party and a private highway authority could 
generate a competitive outcome that enables motorists to benefit from price 
and service packages that are aligned with their varying preferences for speed 
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and reliability. In the process government would obtain revenues from sell-
ing the highway and would be relieved of capital and maintenance expenses, 
while the private highway operator would have an economic incentive to 
introduce new technologies, which the public sector has not introduced, to 
improve traffic flows and safety.
The notion of privatization experiments is a metaphor because I am not 
suggesting that they would be controlled experiments; they are more akin to 
the Schumpeterian notion of creative destruction where private operators 
are given the opportunity to compete with each other to determine the most 
efficient production processes and innovative technologies that respond to 
travelers’ and shippers’ preferences. Accordingly, in a later chapter I identify 
the key features of specific locations where such experiments are likely to 
be feasible and where the benefits from privatization are most likely to be 
realized, thereby generating credible evidence that could help overcome the 
remaining political hurdles and contribute to a constructive change in trans-
portation policy.
Political Reality
The deep recession that began in late 2007 has significantly reduced the 
public’s and policymakers’ confidence in markets and undoubtedly made it 
more difficult politically to privatize and deregulate the transportation sys-
tem. Of course, the U.S. economy will eventually grow again for a sustained 
period, and memories of the recession’s effects will start to fade. In addition 
several factors suggest it is important to look beyond the current political 
climate. First, as noted, the problems associated with the transportation sys-
tem are primarily attributable to government failure, not market failure, and 
the public has become frustrated with the government’s inability to improve 
the system. Second, the nation has been searching for the optimal mix of 
public and private participation in transportation for three centuries, and it 
is not going to accept the status quo as a long-run equilibrium. Third, politi-
cal winds shift very quickly, as indicated by the public’s growing concern 
that the Obama administration’s intervention in the economy may be exces-
sive. Fourth, budgetary pressures have made public officials more receptive 
to private sector participation in transportation, while the long-term effects 
of the recession have intensified officials’ interest in private sector innova-
tions in transportation and other areas of the economy that could spur the 
nation’s growth.
To be sure, overcoming the status quo will be difficult when the costs of 
change are concentrated among powerful interest groups and the benefits 
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are likely to be broadly dispersed. The experiments that I am advocating are 
intended to build political support carefully by convincing transportation 
users, a critical interest group that is likely to be skeptical about privatization 
and deregulation, that they will be better off. For example, Schaller (2010) 
argues that a key lesson from New York City’s failed effort to implement 
Mayor Michael Bloomberg’s congestion pricing plan is that drivers must 
be convinced that highway tolls would make them better off. Policymak-
ers could then overcome remaining interests, especially labor, by arguing 
that the status quo is not a viable option because the transportation system 
will only continue to get worse given the enormous fiscal deficits and that 
privatization and deregulation could relieve budgetary pressures and spur 
innovation and economic growth. 
A Road Map
Readers may find it useful for me to summarize my theoretical perspective 
on the privatization debate and the evidence that I use to develop my argu-
ment. The public sector’s involvement in the U.S. transportation system is 
often taken for granted, but, as noted, the private sector initially provided 
much of the nation’s transportation services and facilities that promoted 
economic development and growth. For example, private ferries, railroads, 
trolleys, and toll roads (such as the Calistoga road) were central to the rapid 
development of Marin and Sonoma counties in the San Francisco Bay Area.10 
The fact that those operators fell prey to the business cycle or bad luck or 
planning was not, in itself, justification for a public takeover.
Indeed, the justification for government intervention and takeover of 
transportation during the past century is far from clear. One cannot make 
the case by simply pointing to alleged market failures, such as the existence 
of scale economies in transit operations, and claim that workable competi-
tion was not possible. In theory, market failures should be compared with 
government failures and how the consequences of each will evolve over time. 
Periodic financial failures by private firms are not necessarily bad if inefficient 
firms exit and are eventually replaced by firms that use more efficient pro-
duction methods and up-to-date technologies. Public provision and regula-
tion may cause greater social costs than are caused by private firms that are 
struggling financially. Moreover, such costs may be concealed from the pub-
lic, the majority of whom do not realize the extent of increasing public sector 
10. I am grateful to Randall Pozdena for this point. 
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inefficiencies and taxpayer subsidies. Indeed, the strongest justification for 
privatization may be that it can eliminate dynamic X-inefficiencies—steadily 
rising production costs and little innovation and technological advance.
Of course, the relative costs and benefits of public and private sector pro-
vision of transportation must be resolved empirically. I rely on the avail-
able scholarly assessments of the performance of the various components 
of the U.S. system, retrospective assessments of the effects of U.S. intercity 
deregulation, and assessments of the hypothetical effects of privatization and 
deregulation of transportation in the United States and the actual effects of 
privatization and deregulation of transportation in foreign countries. My 
focus is primarily on economic efficiency—resource allocation within the 
transportation system—rather than social efficiency, which considers, for 
example, the broader effects of the system on the environment. But I do 
comment on such issues when appropriate. My focus on efficiency implies 
that I believe that the transportation system per se should not be compro-
mised to improve the quality of life for the working or nonworking poor. 
Instead, the system should be as efficient as possible, and social goals such as 
improving the mobility of poor citizens should be accomplished efficiently 
by, for example, instituting a voucher system.
I stress that far more scholarly evidence exists on the performance of the 
current U.S. transportation system under public management and the effects 
of partial deregulation than on the hypothetical effects of privatization in 
the United States and on the actual effects of privatization and deregulation 
in other countries. In addition, the extent of the evidence varies greatly by 
mode and the type of infrastructure (for example, airlines and airports have 
been thoroughly studied, while inland barge transportation and ports have 
received little scholarly attention).
I round out some of the scholarly evidence with anecdotal and descriptive 
evidence from the media and government reports. But because the existing 
empirical evidence is still incomplete, I conclude my journey by calling for 
experiments to fill in critical gaps in our knowledge of the effects of privatiza-
tion and deregulation to help resolve the debate.
Along the way my argument is developed in two parts. In the first part, 
I motivate the case for privatization and deregulation by analyzing the U.S. 
transportation system’s inefficiencies and by arguing that political and insti-
tutional constraints on introducing efficient reforms have enabled those 
inefficiencies to persist and grow. Major inefficiencies arise from residual 
regulation of intercity transportation and from public ownership and man-
agement of urban transportation and aviation infrastructure.
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In the second part, I discuss the evidence indicating that privatization and 
deregulation could raise national welfare and explain the role of experiments. 
I indicate why deregulation of intercity transportation, despite constraints 
on private firms, was successful and outline a theoretical framework for 
assessing the economic effects of privatizing and deregulating the remaining 
parts of the transportation system. Based on academic simulation studies 
and transportation privatization experiments in foreign countries, I enrich 
the theory with the available empirical evidence. Unfortunately, the absence 
of privatized transportation services and infrastructure in the United States 
means that researchers have not had a good “laboratory” to develop persua-
sive evidence on the likely economic effects of privatization and deregula-
tion. Accordingly, I outline political and economic considerations to guide 
experiments that would generate actual evidence of the effects of the policy 
on the performance of the U.S. transportation system. Based on the argu-
ments advanced in the preceding chapters, I expect that the evidence will 
be quite positive and that top-level leadership will use it for outreach and 
public education to achieve a constructive long-term policy change that 
places greater reliance on the private sector to provide an essential input into 
Americans’ work and recreation.
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Airports and Air Traffic Control
5
The first commercial plane flight in the United States, an eighteen-
mile run of the St. Petersburg-Tampa Airboat Line that carried one pay-
ing passenger, took place in 1914. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 
domestic forecasts indicate that by 2014 annual airline passenger enplane-
ments will reach roughly 1 billion.1
Efficient,  technologically  up-to-date  aviation  infrastructure—airports 
and air traffic control—is essential for moving air travelers safely and quickly 
from their origins to their destinations. Responsibility for basic aeronautical 
services in the United States—including terminals, gates, taxiing areas, and 
runways—lies with local governments that operate airports either directly, 
as in the case of small airports, or through airport authorities, as in the case 
of many medium and large airports. The federal Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA) is responsible for airport security, and the FAA pro-
vides air traffic control. In 2004 FAA’s air traffic control function was reorga-
nized into the Air Traffic Organization (ATO), a “performance-based” orga-
nization that, in contrast to a “rules-based” organization, focuses on serving 
its customers instead of on following detailed procedures. Nonetheless, the 
ATO remains an agency within a civil aviation administration that is funded 
by annual budget appropriations from Congress.
How has aviation infrastructure performed? As shown in figure 5-1, the 
chance of a passenger dying in a commercial airline accident has steadily 
declined since air travel began and has become very small during the past few 
decades. Of course, airlines have a strong financial incentive to maintain safe 
operations, so it is not clear whether market forces or public infrastructure 
1. This chapter draws on and extends Morrison and Winston (2008a). 
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spending and regulations deserve most of the credit for the safety of air travel 
in the United States.
During the past decade, air travelers have become increasingly concerned 
about delays they may encounter when going through airport security, leav-
ing the departure gate and taking off, flying to their destination, and landing 
and disembarking from the aircraft. In-flight delays and earlier airport arriv-
als for security screening were estimated to cost passengers and airlines in the 
United States at least $40 billion in 2005.2 As shown in figure 5-2, travel times 
2. Total delay costs for 2005 are obtained as follows. The U.S. Department of Transportation 
(2006) estimated that aircraft delays cost passengers $9.4 billion. This figure is likely to be an 
underestimate because the delays to passengers are inferred from delays to aircraft. Passenger 
delays are likely to be greater than aircraft delays because delays to passengers may cause them 
to miss connections. The figure also does not include baggage handling delays. Using Federal 
Aviation Administration delay data, the Air Transport Association in 2006 estimated that the 
additional operating costs to airlines from delays were $5.9 billion. Finally, a one-hour earlier 
arrival at an airport for security purposes valued at $50 an hour (obtained by applying Trans-
portation Department guidelines to determine the value of time in 2005 for airline travelers) 
for roughly 500 million trips resulted in an additional cost to passengers of $25 billion. This 
figure does not include the loss to airlines from the reduction in passenger volume at airports 
that is attributable to passenger and baggage screening. 
Source: Air Transport Association.
Note: All data reflect systemwide scheduled service performed by U.S. air carriers, including major 
and commuter carriers, of both passenger and cargo flights operating under 14 CFR Part 121 of Air 
Carrier Certification. Fatalities include passengers and crew members, but not persons on the ground.
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have been increasing for the past three decades. But the problem is becom-
ing so severe that at least one major airline carrier, Air Canada, is offering 
delay insurance, which pays for lodging and even airfare on rival carriers in 
the event that it cancels a flight or a traveler misses a connection because of 
its actions.3
In my view, excessive travel delays are—to a significant extent—a mani-
festation of the failure of publicly owned and managed airports and air traf-
fic control to adopt policies and introduce innovations that could greatly 
improve the efficiency of the U.S. air transportation system. Given little 
economic incentive and saddled with institutional and political constraints, 
major airports and the air traffic control system have not exhibited any 
marked improvement in their performance for decades despite repeated 
assurances that they would do so, and they have provided little reason for 
policymakers and travelers to expect such improvements to ever occur.
3. Scott McCartney, “Letting Fliers Buy Protection against Delays,” Wall Street Journal, May 
20, 2008. 
Source: U.S. Department of Transportation, Service Segment Data and Schedule T-100, Data 
Bank 28DS, Domestic Segment Data. Data for 2009 are through October.
Figure 5-2.  Air Travel Delays 
Change in flight time (minutes)
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Some  observers  believe  that  delays  would  be  reduced  if  the  nation 
invested more money in building new airports and in upgrading air traffic 
control technology. Such spending could be economically justified, but its 
returns would be compromised by the system’s vast inefficiencies. Delays 
should be reduced primarily by efficient pricing of and investment in avia-
tion infrastructure.
Overview of U.S. Aviation Infrastructure and Current Policy
When air travel began in this country, airports were privately owned, often 
by airlines. Smaller airports continue to be privately owned, but the FAA 
prohibits private airports from offering commercial service because it may 
adversely affect the national aviation system. The prohibition is lifted only 
for those airports that have been approved to participate in a very limited 
number of privatization experiments that I note in a later chapter.
For the most part, the federal government has shaped the development 
of aviation infrastructure through congressional funding of—and the FAA’s 
allocation of those funds for—airports and air traffic control. The federal 
government also has a major presence at airports through the TSA’s screen-
ing of passengers and luggage. Different regulations and funding sources 
govern the operations of those services, so it is useful to discuss the evolution 
of current policy toward them separately.
Airports
The Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 is notable for instituting economic regula-
tion of fares, entry, and exit in the U.S. airline industry, but it also paved the 
way for federal funding of airports by authorizing funds to build additional 
airfields.4 Previously, states and local governments had sole responsibility for 
airport planning and issued general obligation bonds that were supported by 
taxes to pay for runways, terminal construction, and improvements in those 
facilities. The Federal Airport Act of 1946 created an intergovernmental grant 
program, providing federal matching funds to states and local governments 
for airport projects. The program lasted until 1970 when it was replaced by 
the Airport Development Program, which increased federal funding for con-
struction and improvements at large pubic airports. Since the passage of the 
Airport and Airway Improvement Act of 1982, federal funding for airport 
4. Dilger (2003) provides a complete discussion of the major federal legislation related to 
airports and air traffic control. 
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projects that seek to enhance airport safety, capacity, security, and the envi-
ronment are provided under the Airport Improvement Program (AIP). AIP 
funds are drawn from the Airport and Airway Trust Fund, consisting of reve-
nues from aviation excise taxes, fuel taxes, and other sources, and distributed 
by the FAA to airports of all sizes on the basis of congressional priorities.5
As shown later, the majority of AIP funds are allocated to airports that 
account for a small share of commercial enplanements. In addition, because 
the demand for AIP funds exceeds availability, the FAA typically apportions 
the funds into major entitlement categories such as primary, cargo, and 
general aviation. Any remaining funds are then distributed at the discretion 
of the FAA.
Airports continue to issue bonds to help pay for terminals and runways, 
and they use the passenger facility charge to cover some bond payments 
for projects approved by the FAA.6 Airports also meet expenses with rev-
enues generated from parking fees, retail store rents, and advertising display 
charges. Finally, airports raise revenues by renting terminal facilities such as 
counters and gates to airlines and by charging landing fees based on an air-
craft’s weight subject to guidelines set by the FAA. Runway landing fees vary 
widely, but currently a typical fee is $2.00 per 1,000 pounds of weight. For 
example, landing fees for a Boeing 757-200 aircraft, with a maximum design 
landing weight of 198,000 pounds and a capacity of about 186 passengers, 
would be somewhat less than $3 a passenger for typical passenger loads. Dur-
ing the 1950s and 1960s, as a quid pro quo for airlines agreeing to pay off 
billions of dollars in airport bonds for expansion projects, airlines obtained 
exclusive-use gate leases (that is, gates leased exclusively to one airline) at 
many large and midsize airports.
Airports and airlines use either a residual or a compensatory charging 
system to establish rents and landing fees (Graham 2004). Passenger facility 
charges are localized and spent at the airport’s discretion. Under a residual 
charging system, airlines pay the remaining costs of running the airport 
after commercial and nonairline sources of revenue are taken into account. 
5. Currently, the trust fund is composed of revenue from a 7.5 percent ticket tax plus a fee 
of $3.30 per passenger for each flight segment flown, a fee of $14.50 per passenger for each 
international departure and arrival, a 6.25 percent cargo waybill tax, a 7.5 percent frequent flier 
tax on third parties (such as credit card companies) that sell frequent flier miles, and a fuel tax 
of 4.3 cents a gallon. At the end of fiscal year 2008 the trust fund’s uncommitted balance was 
$1.4 billion—well below its uncommitted balance of $7.3 billion in 2001—and it was expected 
to fall further in the following years, possibly even to run out.
6. Congress is currently considering legislation that would increase passenger facility charges 
from $4.50 to $7 a passenger to generate an additional $1.1 billion in revenue for airports. 
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The airlines guarantee that the level of charges and rents will enable the 
airport to break even. Under a compensatory charging system, the airlines 
agree to pay charges that allow the airport to recover the costs of the facili-
ties that the airlines occupy and use. The airport is responsible for covering 
the remaining costs such as parking and concessions. In practice negotia-
tions between airlines and large and midsize airports have not resulted in 
a clear preference for one system over the other. In addition airport opera-
tions do not appear to be affected by the choice of charging system. Some of 
the contracts detailing the charges airlines pay to airports contain “majority 
in interest” clauses that give the airlines signing long-term lease agreements 
the right to approve certain capital expenditures, especially spending on ter-
minals and gates.
Given a variety of funding sources, airports—in contrast to airlines—
have generally been able to maintain their financial health even in the period 
after September 11, 2001, and in subsequent periods characterized by sky-
rocketing fuel bills and a deep recession. To maintain their airline tenants’ 
operations, some airports (among them, Boston, Detroit, Philadelphia, San 
Francisco, and San Jose) have directly cut fees and charges or offered dis-
counts to carriers that serve additional cities or expand existing service—or 
taken both steps.
More than 19,000 public and private airports operate in the United States, 
some 3,300 of which have been identified by the FAA’s National Plan of 
Integrated Airport Systems as significant to national air transportation and 
therefore eligible to receive federal grants under the AIP. Table 5-1 classi-
fies those airports by size and presents their share of commercial enplane-
ments and federal grants, which are assessed later in the chapter along with 
other data on the allocation of AIP funds. The thirty-one large hub airports 
account for more than two-thirds of commercial air travelers, but only one 
new large hub airport has been constructed since 1973. Built in Denver in 
1995, that airport has advantages that are difficult to replicate elsewhere—a 
flat, largely uninhabited site that is fewer than thirty miles from downtown. 
More than half of the nation’s large hub airports are on sites that were cho-
sen in the 1920s, 1930s, or 1940s and were later significantly expanded (Alt-
shuler and Luberoff 2003). Those airports and others built more recently 
have expanded available aircraft capacity by building new runways, but add-
ing capacity in this fashion takes considerable time because airports must 
account for communities’ input, especially their opposition to proposed 
projects. Since 1970 such projects also must satisfy Environmental Protec-
tion Agency environmental impact standards.
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Airport Security
Before the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, airlines were responsible for 
providing passenger screening, and the FAA was responsible for promulgat-
ing performance and training standards. The airlines hired roughly 19,500 
screeners from private security companies to perform screening procedures 
at U.S. airports (GAO 2005a).
After the attacks, some observers claimed that reliance on private screen-
ers was disastrous, but it should be noted that the screeners were subject to 
government regulations. In addition, it is fair to say that the public got what 
it perceived to be the level of safety that it wanted. In any case, the Trans-
portation Security Administration was initially created as part of the Depart-
ment of Transportation and in February 2002 it assumed responsibility for 
screening at virtually all U.S. airports; in November 2002 it was folded into 
the newly created Department of Homeland Security. By the end of 2002 the 
TSA deployed a workforce that, accounting for temporary employees, had 
grown to more than 50,000 screeners.
Passengers pay $2.50 for each leg of their flight, up to a maximum of $10 
a round trip, to help pay for security screening. Airlines then remit the fees 
to the TSA to help support its annual budget of roughly $5.5 billion.7 To 
7. The fiscal year 2011 budget proposal for the Department of Homeland Security includes 
a $1 increase in each passenger’s security fee. 




Share of grants 
(percent)




Large hub 31 24 70
Medium hub 35 15 19
Small hub 71 15 8
Nonhub 282 19 3
General aviation, relievers, and 
other commercial service 2,981 28 0
Source: U.S. General Accounting Office (2002), Federal Aviation Administration (2000). 
a. A large hub handles at least 1 percent of national enplanements, a medium hub from 0.25 
percent to 1.0 percent of enplanements, a small hub from 0.05 to 0.25 percent of enplanements.   
A nonhub has more than 10,000 annual enplanements but less than 0.05 percent of the national 
total.  General aviation, reliever, and other commercial service airports do not provide regularly 
scheduled commercial flights, although some house air taxi services. 
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facilitate flexibility in staffing that can respond to changes in airline service, 
airports have been given the option to replace federal screeners with screen-
ers from private companies. But private screeners are still overseen by federal 
employees and are required to be paid at least as much as federal ones and to 
have undergone the same training. Not surprisingly, only a handful of (small) 
airports have applied to the government to use privately employed screeners.
In response to air travelers’ complaints about the excessive delays cre-
ated by TSA screening at major airports, a “registered traveler” program was 
initiated to create special, speedier airport security lines for people who are 
willing to pay an annual fee of $50 to $100 and undergo background checks. 
However, the TSA has balked at Congress’s direction to conduct background 
checks on registered traveler applicants and to provide expedited screening to 
those who passed. That undercut the potential value that the three approved 
registered traveler companies offered to members, and caused Clear, the 
largest provider, to enter bankruptcy. Its new owners and another entrant 
have announced their intention to relaunch security-screening lanes by the 
fall of 2010. Airlines, such as American and United, have tried to expedite 
screening at certain airports by instituting special security lines for travelers 
who are elite members of their frequent flier programs.
Air Traffic Control
The scope of federal provision of air traffic control was expanded by a series 
of fatal midair collisions and thousands of near misses during the mid-1950s. 
Concerned that the negative publicity about air safety would sharply cur-
tail passenger demand, aviation interests supported the creation of a larger 
federal agency to oversee air traffic control and other safety issues. Thus, in 
an atmosphere of crisis, Congress passed the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 
which gave enhanced responsibility for managing the nation’s navigable air-
space to the new Federal Aviation Agency (renamed the Federal Aviation 
Administration in 1967, when it was brought into the newly established 
Department of Transportation, or DOT).
In practice the FAA operates facilities to ensure that air travel is safe and 
to prevent the system from becoming congested both along the flight route 
and near airport terminals. En route facilities include air route traffic control 
centers (ARTCCs) that provide air traffic control service to aircraft operating 
under instrument flight rules within controlled airspace.8 Terminal facili-
ties include radar towers at airports and terminal radar approach facilities 
(TRACONs) within a fifty-mile radius of an airport; both provide service to 
8. ARTCCs may also assist with aircraft flying under visual flight rules. 
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aircraft that are arriving, departing, and transiting the controlled airspace. 
The FAA system includes roughly one hundred and fifty radar towers, thirty-
five TRACONs, and twenty-one ARTCCs. The FAA is also responsible for 
hiring air traffic controllers and other air traffic control personnel and for 
supplying terminal and en route facilities with new equipment.
The FAA and its programs are supported by the Airport and Airway Trust 
Fund as well as by general revenues. Commercial airlines pay for more than 
90 percent of the costs of the system, while private business jets pay for most 
of the small remaining share. In addition, the military provides as well as 
uses air traffic control. Given that commercial airlines account for only two-
thirds of all flights, they contend that they are overpaying for air traffic con-
trol services.
The FAA funds research and development to improve air travel safety and 
efficiency, but an ongoing challenge for the agency has been to adopt and 
implement the latest technological advances to expand the airspace where 
planes can fly safely and to reduce controller error and aircraft encounters 
with dangerous weather, both of which contribute to accidents. For example, 
during the early 1980s the FAA announced plans to develop an advanced 
automation system to provide flexible, computer-oriented air traffic con-
trol capable of handling greater traffic volumes at reduced manpower. The 
system also included significant improvements in detecting wind shear, the 
primary cause of several crashes, including two major ones in the 1980s.
Although some progress has certainly been made in implementing that 
system, its development has been characterized by delays and inefficiencies.9 
Scheduled to be completed by 1991 for $12 billion, the fully upgraded system 
is almost two decades late, billions of dollars over budget, and still nowhere 
in sight. As of 2007 the cost of the modernization was expected to climb to 
$51 billion (current dollars).
Moreover, by the time the FAA’s upgrade is complete, the system will be 
approaching technological obsolescence. Air travel can become even safer 
and faster if air traffic control replaces its ground-based radar systems with 
more accurate and reliable satellite communications. The satellite-based sys-
tem, known as NextGen (for Next Generation) would allow pilots and con-
trollers to be cognizant of other planes in the vicinity as well as their speeds, 
headings, and flight numbers. Travel times would be reduced because planes 
9. The U.S. General Accounting Office issued a series of reports in the late 1990s that crit-
ically assessed the FAA’s progress in modernizing the air traffic control system (GAO 1998, 
1999a, 1999b). More recent critical assessments include Dillingham (2003) and Mead (2003). 
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would be able to fly closer together and take the most direct routes to their 
destinations using signals from global position satellites to navigate. In addi-
tion, NextGen would provide real-time information about wind conditions 
to facilitate optimal altitudes and routings, save fuel, and increase through-
put. Finally, pilots would be able to operate in cloudy and foggy weather 
much as they do on clear days. Radar is imprecise—it typically updates air-
craft positions every 4.8 seconds and forces controllers to separate aircraft 
by several miles to avoid collisions. In contrast, the automatic dependent 
surveillance broadcast (a key component of NextGen known by the acronym 
ADS-B) updates positions every second. The FAA has recently proposed a 
rule for airlines and business jets to equip all aircraft operating in controlled 
airspace with ADS-B-compatible avionics by 2020.
NextGen could also increase throughput at airports by making it feasible 
to provide short-haul service on 3,000 foot runways because certain aircraft 
types (such as planes carrying no more than 100 passengers) would be able to 
follow precise independent approach and departure paths in a metropolitan 
area’s terminal airspace. Such aircraft could use underutilized short runways 
at major hubs and serve reliever airports in the same metropolitan area as a 
congested hub airport.
Because the NextGen system would require only a few dozen facilities dis-
persed throughout the country, managing that system would be much sim-
pler and less costly than managing the current system. Much of the current 
system of radar towers, TRACONS, and en route centers would be elimi-
nated. The remaining facilities would be consolidated, with some provid-
ing backup capabilities in case of a major system failure. By replacing most 
radars with ADS-B equipment on planes, along with ground-based equip-
ment, thousands of costly-to-maintain radars and other ground-based navi-
gation aids could be retired.
Key components of the system are moving forward, after having been 
tested in Alaska. Although Alaska is not representative of most flying condi-
tions, the FAA reports that since ADS-B satellite navigation was first deployed 
in aircraft, the fatality rate for general aviation in Alaska has dropped roughly 
40 percent.10 The system’s technology is also being used for commercial air-
line flights across the Gulf of Mexico, by helicopters serving Gulf oil plat-
forms, by UPS at its air cargo hub in Louisville, Kentucky, and by Alaska 
Airlines for flights into and out of Seattle airport. US Airways will engage 
10. Del Quentin Wilber, “Overhaul of Air Traffic System Nears Key Step,” Washington Post, 
August 27, 2007. 
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in a trial in 2010 in the Northeast corridor airspace, when part of its fleet 
is equipped with ADS-B. Southwest Airlines is the first airline to commit 
to upgrading its entire fleet to use satellite-based navigation approaches to 
airports. The FAA plans to switch completely from today’s radar-based to 
satellite-based air traffic control—that is, to replace the system it has been 
working on for more than twenty years but has not fully completed. How-
ever, the timetable, as outlined by the Joint Planning and Developing Office 
that is coordinating the effort, calls for NextGen to take twenty-five years to 
complete at a cost of at least $30 billion.11
In sum, the federal government has shaped the nation’s aviation infra-
structure through its long-term strategic planning and design, allocation of 
funds, project approval process, and specific policy guidelines on runway 
charges, air traffic control charges, and the like. I now consider how the gov-
ernment’s pervasive presence has affected the air transportation system’s 
performance.
An Economic Assessment
The value that travelers place on air transportation reflects its convenience, 
price, and safety. In theory, aviation infrastructure policy should enhance 
those attributes by efficiently reducing travel delays, facilitating greater air-
line competition, and using the most effective technology to keep flying safe. 
In practice, the evidence indicates that current policy should be reformed to 
make greater progress toward achieving all of those goals.
Performance of Airports
Airport policy encompasses charging aircraft for their use of the runways, 
investing in runways, leasing gates, and screening passengers and luggage. I 
draw on scholarly and anecdotal evidence to assess the efficiency of current 
policies.
Runway Pricing. As noted, airports charge airlines landing fees that are 
based on the weight of the aircraft and that are consistent with the terms of 
the residual or compensatory contract that the parties negotiate. Generally, 
11. Jennifer Oldham, “Nation’s Air Traffic Control Again Nearing Obsolescence,” Los Angeles 
Times, June 3, 2006; Barbara Peterson, “End of Flight Delays?” Popular Mechanics, August 2007. 
In fact, the $30 billion figure may seriously underestimate the cost of NextGen. As reported 
by the Associated Press, “Air Traffic Upgrade Costs Seen Ballooning,” February 7, 2008, Calvin 
L. Scovel III, inspector general for the U.S. Department of Transportation, indicated that the 
system’s software development alone could cost more than $50 billion. 
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the fees do not vary by time of day. But congestion—which delays travel-
ers—does, in accordance with the volume of aircraft traffic. Beginning with 
Levine (1969) and Carlin and Park (1970), researchers have called for air-
ports to reduce delays by replacing weight-based landing fees with efficient 
landing and takeoff tolls based on an aircraft’s contribution to congestion.
Weight-based landing fees were probably a reasonable way to allocate air-
port costs and raise revenue when airports were not severely congested, but 
today the principal cost that an aircraft imposes when it takes off or lands 
is the delay it imposes on other aircraft. (Runway damage caused by most 
aircraft is small.) Based on a sample of aircraft operations at thirty-one of the 
most congested airports in the United States, Morrison and Winston (1989) 
found that this delay can be substantial. For example, the elasticity of aver-
age departure delay, defined as the percentage change in average departure 
delay caused by a 1 percent change in aircraft departures, is 2.9 for commer-
cial carriers and 2.5 for general aviation. Thus, current weight-based landing 
fees, which charge large planes much more than they charge small planes but 
account for a small share of large planes’ operating costs, have little effect on 
congestion because a plane waiting to take off or land is delayed at least the 
same amount of time by a small private plane as by a jumbo jet.12
Morrison and Winston modeled airport users’ demand and the rela-
tionship between airport operations and delay and estimated that replacing 
weight-based landing fees with efficient marginal-cost takeoff and landing 
tolls could generate significant annual net benefits to the nation. Travel-
ers would reap $5.3 billion in reduced delay costs, and carriers would gain 
$1.8 billion from lower operating costs. And although airports would gain 
substantial revenue from higher takeoff and landing fees, that gain would be 
modestly exceeded by travelers’ losses in consumer surplus as airlines pass 
on the cost of the tolls in higher ticket prices. That difference would partly 
offset the gains to travelers and carriers, resulting in net benefits of nearly $6 
billion (expressed in 2005 dollars). As discussed below, the redistribution 
from travelers to airports would be softened if efficient tolls were combined 
with efficient runway investment.
12. To be more precise, delay is affected by the type of lead and trailing aircraft (Ball, Dono-
hue, and Hoffman 2006). If the lead aircraft is small, then the flight separation time for a heavy 
aircraft (that is, one with a maximum certified takeoff weight of 300,000 pounds or more) is 
64 seconds and the flight separation time for a small aircraft is 80 seconds. Those times are 
comparable. But if the lead aircraft is heavy, then the flight separation time for a small aircraft, 
240 seconds, is much greater than the flight separation time for a heavy aircraft, 100 seconds. 
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Recently Brueckner (2002) raised doubts about the extent to which opti-
mal airport pricing would reduce delays. In the case of highway travel, effi-
cient tolls charge motorists for the delay they cause all motorists. But in the 
case of air travel, a given American Airlines flight, for example, may delay 
another American Airlines flight. It could be argued that American Airlines’ 
operations take that delay into account, or “internalize” the delay.13 Thus, 
American should be charged only for the delays it imposes on other carri-
ers. If American has a 50 percent share of operations at an airport, it should 
be charged for one-half of the delay costs it creates—the delay imposed on 
other carriers—whereas the carrier’s smaller (atomistic) competitors with 
a very small share of airport operations should be charged for all the delay 
they create because their delay is imposed virtually entirely on other car-
riers. Mayer and Sinai (2003) apply this idea to hub airports where domi-
nant carriers cluster their operations to provide convenient connections for 
passengers (while nondominant carriers operate most of their flights at less 
congested times); thus, optimal tolls at hub airports should be small because 
most delay at hub airports is internalized.
Of course, the fully efficient charges at congested airports would raise 
political problems because carriers with smaller market shares would pay 
higher charges than carriers with larger market shares would pay, or they may 
be forced to abandon the airport. However, those issues appear to be moot 
because Morrison and Winston (2007) find that the large welfare improve-
ment from setting congestion tolls that assume atomistic behavior would 
increase only modestly if optimal tolls were set along the lines suggested by 
Brueckner and by Mayer and Sinai. The reasons are that a large fraction of 
delays is caused by commercial and commuter carriers and general aviation 
that behave atomistically (that is, there is more than twice as much external 
delay as internal delay), and that the nature of carriers’ (private) average costs 
and their (social) marginal costs, the two factors that account for the costs of 
congestion for a given level of traffic, means that the benefits from correctly 
charging carriers for contributing to congestion greatly exceed the costs of 
incorrectly charging them when their congestion has been internalized.
Instead of using the price mechanism at congested airports to curb delays 
efficiently, the FAA has instituted arbitrary quantity controls, namely, take-
off and landing slots, at some airports. Since 1969 limits—called slots—have 
been set on the number of takeoffs and landings per hour at New York 
13. Daniel (1995) empirically explored the extent to which an airline’s internalization of 
delay costs affected its pattern of operations. 
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LaGuardia, New York Kennedy, Washington Reagan National, and Chi-
cago O’Hare airports. Slots are now also in effect at Newark Liberty Airport. 
Although it is theoretically possible to design a slot system that has the same 
welfare properties as efficient tolls, no evidence exists that slot controls at 
U.S. airports have been designed optimally, whereas evidence does exist that 
slots have tended to reduce competition and raise fares (Morrison and Win-
ston 2000).14
Congress has acted in the past to eliminate slots, but the FAA has coun-
tered by imposing administrative controls in response to traffic growth. For 
example, the FAA has dealt with congestion at O’Hare by getting hub carriers 
together in a room and allowing American Airlines and United Airlines to 
agree to reduce flights, and it has proposed a new rule at New York LaGuar-
dia, which was eventually withdrawn, that would discourage the use of small 
jets by imposing an average plane size of 105 to 122 seats for all gates at 
the airport. Both actions exemplify the FAA’s preference for an (inefficient) 
administrative solution over a potentially efficient market-oriented solution.
In the summer of 2007 air travel delays—a large fraction of which ema-
nate from the New York area airports—reached record heights and incon-
venienced millions of travelers. Under the leadership of then Transportation 
Secretary Mary Peters and Assistant Secretary Tyler Duvall, the department 
tried to introduce efficient pricing policies to reduce airport congestion but 
encountered strong—and ultimately successful—opposition from airlines, 
airport authorities, and certain members of Congress.
One new federal policy allows airports to charge higher landing fees dur-
ing peak periods; that change to federal airport rates and charges policy went 
into effect in 2008 (the federal appeals court recently rejected a challenge by 
the airline industry to this policy).15 Secretary Peters’ proposal to auction off 
some takeoff and landing slots at New York Kennedy, LaGuardia, and New-
ark airports met with even stronger opposition. The airlines preferred to have 
airports cap the total number of flights during peak hours to reduce con-
gestion—of course, competition would also be reduced and fares increased. 
14. I am not aware of evidence that slots produce benefits in reduced delays that offset their 
costs. Whalen and others (2008) suggest that an auction system with well-defined property 
rights could be used to efficiently allocate slots to air carriers. 
15. Levine (2007) points out legal and other issues that have to be addressed to implement 
airport congestion pricing successfully. These include providing no exemptions for foreign car-
riers and general aviation, addressing the monopoly airport problem where it exists, and using 
the revenues from congestion pricing to expand airport capacity but not for other unrelated 
purposes. 
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Because policy toward the New York area airports is likely to set the tone for 
policy toward other congested airports, the dispute between the administra-
tion and key stakeholders intensified and the auction proposal was blocked 
in federal court. The new secretary of transportation, Ray LaHood, cancelled 
the proposal in May 2009, claiming to still be serious about tackling con-
gestion in the region and planning to seek input from stakeholders about 
the best ways to move forward. The opposition to the department’s laudable 
efforts under Secretaries Peters and Duvall is indicative of the obstacles to try-
ing to implement efficient policies in publicly owned transportation facilities.
Runway Investment. During the past fifty years, public officials have 
attempted to keep up with growing demand for air travel primarily by build-
ing more runways at existing airports rather than by building additional 
large airports. Any effort to build new large airports would encounter sig-
nificant logistical, financial, and political challenges, but even adding a new 
runway is fraught with hurdles because airports must contend with commu-
nity opposition and meet federal environmental impact standards. Indeed, 
the nation’s thirty-one large hub airports, which account for the majority 
of delays, built just three new runways during the 1980s and six during the 
1990s. In 1999 the Air Transport Association, representing major air car-
riers, and the National Air Traffic Controllers joined forces and called for 
“fifty miles of concrete”—the equivalent of twenty-five new runways—as an 
antidote to growing delays. More than a dozen runways have been christened 
since then, but the time and cost to build some of them have been excessive. 
For example, it took Atlanta nearly twenty-five years and an estimated cost 
of $1.3 billion to have its new (fifth) runway; Boston’s sixth runway was put 
into service at the end of 2006, thirty years after it was initially planned; and 
St. Louis’s new runway cost $1.1 billion while its value to travelers is ques-
tionable because the airport now has excess capacity (partly because TWA’s 
airline assets were acquired by American Airlines). The construction of taxi-
ways has also been delayed. For example, after a seven-year delay, Boston was 
scheduled to finish construction of a taxiway in 2009 to reduce the danger of 
plane collisions.
Runway investments often meet opposition when they are part of an air-
port’s comprehensive plan to upgrade its facilities. For example, Los Ange-
les airport (LAX) has been trying for more than a decade to develop a pro-
posal acceptable to the surrounding residential community and the FAA that 
would involve building a new terminal and reconfiguring some of its run-
ways. Chicago O’Hare has also been trying for decades to gain approval for an 
expansion plan that would add two new runways, lengthen and widen some 
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of its existing runways, and build new passenger terminals and parking spaces 
for oversize jets and passenger jet bridges. The plan was expected to alleviate 
delays caused by O’Hare’s intersecting runways and vulnerability to winds 
from the southwest. O’Hare finally succeeded in moving ahead with a $15 bil-
lion expansion plan; but after overcoming delays, in part because homes had 
to be demolished and a cemetery had to be moved, the city enraged United 
Airlines  and  American  Airlines  and  jeopardized  the  project  by  recently 
announcing that it planned to raise terminal rents and landing fees.16
The impediments to building new runways efficiently should be of great 
concern because their potential benefits are huge. Morrison and Winston 
(1989) analyzed the situation where an airport owns land and is able to con-
struct an additional runway measuring 10,000 feet by 150 feet. Optimal run-
way capacity is reached when the marginal cost of an additional runway is 
equated with the marginal benefit of reduced delay. Morrison and Winston 
found that a policy of efficient congestion tolls and optimal runway capacity 
could generate roughly $16 billion (2005 dollars) in annual benefits. Travel-
ers would gain nearly $12 billion in reduced delays and also would pay lower 
fares because the expansion in runway capacity would reduce congestion to 
such an extent that, on average, landing fees would fall.17 Carriers benefit 
from the lower operating costs from reduced delay, while airports’ net rev-
enues would fall slightly. But because airports are characterized by overall 
constant returns to scale, they would be financially self-sufficient under opti-
mal pricing and investment (Morrison 1983).
To be sure, Morrison and Winston’s findings largely neglect the practical 
and political difficulties that many airports face when trying to expand their 
runway capacity. That said, airports that have recently opened a new run-
way are providing very favorable reports—for example, Chicago O’Hare’s 
new runway in 2008 is claimed to have reduced average airport delays from 
twenty-four minutes to sixteen.18 In sum, the reductions in delays from 
additional runways at most major airports are so large and so important 
in softening the distributional effects of optimal pricing that federal policy 
16. Julie Johnsson and John Hilkevitch, “United, American Threaten to Call Off O’Hare 
Expansion Talks,” Chicago Tribune, February 10, 2010. 
17. General aviation would face higher landing fees. But the Morrison-Winston model does 
not account for the greater flexibility that people who use general aviation have in their choice 
of airport and arrival and departure time; thus their loss is overstated. 
18. Scott McCartney, “How a New Runway at O’Hare Makes Travel Easier for All,” Wall 
Street Journal, July 22, 2009. To be sure, the reported delay savings attributable to a new runway 
may capture other factors, such as airlines’ reductions in flights as a result of lower demand, 
which affect delays. 
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has unquestionably compromised traveler and carrier welfare by helping to 
turn runway construction into a task that is measured in decades and bil-
lions of dollars.19
Federal  grants  under  the  Airport  Improvement  Program  are  used  to 
reduce delays at airports; however, the program suffers from two inefficien-
cies. First, political forces cause federal funds to be distributed more broadly 
across airports than they would be if they were allocated according to cost-
benefit guidelines. In fiscal year 2009 the 100 largest metropolitan airports, 
which account for 84 percent of airline passengers, received only 37 percent 
of AIP funds.20 Given that the nation’s large and medium hub airports serve 
89 percent of the nation’s passengers and receive only 39 percent of federal 
airport grant dollars, table 5-1 also suggests a modest correlation between 
the airports that receive federal funds for projects that are primarily intended 
to reduce travel delays and the airports that experience the greatest delays. It 
is particularly striking that 28 percent of the grants go to small airports that 
are likely to process a small number of daily operations and that do not offer 
commercial service by regularly scheduled carriers.21 The AIP program has 
also not been immune to earmarking that has occurred in highway spend-
ing. An obvious example is the newly renamed but little-used John Murtha 
Johnstown-Cambria County Airport, for which the late representative John 
Murtha of Pennsylvania secured at least $150 million during the past decade.
Second, efficient runway prices signal which airports will benefit most 
from additional runway investment. But the AIP program does not make 
decisions using this signal; instead it makes them subject to constraints on 
efficient runway investments just noted.
Gate Utilization and Airport Access. Airport gates are classified 
as exclusive use (leased exclusively to one airline), preferential use (the 
19. One federal agency, the Food and Drug Administration, recognized that the delays it 
imposed on the introduction of new drugs were generating large social costs. Accordingly, as 
part of the 1992 Prescription Drug User Fee Act, the FDA set user fees that were paid by phar-
maceutical companies and used the revenues to hire additional new drug reviewers to improve 
the speed and efficiency of its reviews. In contrast, although the FAA has recently claimed that 
it is streamlining environmental reviews (see Benet Wilson, “FAA: Airport Capacity Improved 
with Boost in Runways Built,” Aviation Now, September 26, 2006), it is not clear that the FAA 
has expedited the construction of new runways. 
20. The figures are from Brookings Metropolitan Center calculations based on data from the 
FAA Airport Improvement Program.
21. Chase Davis, “Tiny Iowa Airports Take Off with Millions in FAA Grants,” Des Moines 
Register, June 4, 2008, reports that since 2007, 42 percent of Iowa’s AIP grants have gone to 
airports that provide no commercial service and that process fewer than fifty takeoffs and land-
ings a day. 
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airport operator may assign the gate temporarily to another carrier when 
it is not being used by the lessee), or common use (the airport authority 
makes all gate assignments). Gates available for use by new entrants consist 
of common-use gates, preferential-use gates that are made available by the 
airport authority, and exclusive-use gates that are made available by incum-
bent carriers. In a 1998 survey of forty-one major airports, the Air Trans-
port Association found that 56 percent of the gates were exclusive use, 25 
percent were preferential use, and 18 percent were common use, resulting 
in 25 percent of the gates available for use by new entrants (Morrison and 
Winston 2000, p. 23).
The prevalence of exclusive-use gates that are not made available to other 
carriers—a legacy of airline-airport contractual arrangements established 
during the 1950s and 1960s—makes it difficult for new entrants to provide 
service at several airports. Another problem facing nonincumbent carriers, 
especially at airports where most gates are exclusively leased, is that they 
must often sublet gates from incumbent carriers at nonpreferred times and 
at a higher cost than the incumbent pays.
In principle an airport has a legal obligation to provide reasonable access 
to the facility. Policymakers, however, have yet to define precisely what rea-
sonable means. Hence, some incumbents are able to prevent competitors 
from having access even to gates that are little used. For example, Delta offers 
just thirty-nine departures a day at LAX but still uses sixteen gates in two 
terminals.22 Since 2002 JetBlue has expressed an interest in serving Chicago 
O’Hare, but subleasing a gate from another carrier was a difficult proposi-
tion because incumbents did not welcome the competition.23 Finally, in 2006 
JetBlue received federal authorization, which was needed because O’Hare is 
slot constrained, for four daily departures. Virgin America has faced obsta-
cles in developing its U.S. network because it has been unable to serve New-
ark airport, expand its operations at New York Kennedy airport, or establish 
service at O’Hare.24
In a few cases, airports have actually bought back and terminated long-
term leases on their own gates. For example, the Maryland Aviation Admin-
istration agreed to pay US Airways $4.3 million to give up twenty-nine gates 
at  Baltimore-Washington  airport,  enabling  expansion  by  Southwest  and 
22. Scott McCartney, “Fewer Travelers Routed through ‘Hub’ Airports,” Wall Street Journal, 
February 14, 2006, p. D4.
23. Mark Skertic, “ ‘Jet Who’ Has City Blues,” Chicago Tribune, January 8, 2006.
24. Susan Stellin, “Seeking a Place at Airports,” New York Times, January 26, 2010.
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AirTran.25 And the Los Angeles Airport Commission voted to spend up to 
$154 million to take over several terminals at LAX to free up aircraft parking 
spots for discount carriers and other airlines that had tried to add flights at 
the airport.26
Morrison and Winston (2000) found that, all else equal, fares are $4.4 
billion (2005 dollars) higher annually because of the limited availability of 
gates at many major and midsize airports. The loss to travelers reflects the 
competitive disadvantages that new entrants face when they are unable to 
acquire gates or can acquire them only at nonpreferred times and locations 
or at excessive cost.27
Finally, commercial carriers’ access can be delayed and even blocked at 
existing airports by regulatory proceedings. In 2006 Southwest Airlines pro-
posed to offer flights at Boeing Field in Washington State, but after receiv-
ing input from various stakeholders, including policymakers who were con-
cerned about how Southwest’s service would affect Alaska Airlines, King 
County officials blocked the proposal. Horizon Air and Allegiant Air have 
proposed to fly passengers from Paine Field, located thirty miles north of 
Seattle. But federal environmental reviews have already delayed commercial 
service for a few years, and local residents who oppose flights could use the 
process to delay service even longer. Such examples indicate that commercial 
air carriers may encounter obstacles to serving private airports even if com-
mercial service is no longer prohibited at those airports.
Performance of Airport Security
An efficient airport security system allocates resources based on costs and 
benefits by directing expenditures toward detecting the greatest threats to 
safety and preventing them from materializing. Although I am not aware 
of a formal economic assessment of the Transportation Security Adminis-
tration’s passenger screening, the Department of Homeland Security, GAO, 
and the TSA routinely test screeners’ ability to intercept weapons smuggled 
through checkpoints. The results have been poor. Both GAO and Homeland 
25. Scott McCartney, “Airports Crack Down on Games,” Wall Street Journal, June 7, 2005.
26. Jennifer Oldham, “Panel Acts to Control LAX Terminals,” Los Angeles Times, January 9, 
2007.
27. Private entrepreneurs are not precluded by airport authorities from building gates and 
leasing or selling them to new entrants. But they are subject to the airport authority’s deter-
mination of what constitutes a fair and reasonable charge for the use of a gate. This regulatory 
arrangement has apparently dissuaded private entities from building gates at airports where 
new entrants face difficulties in acquiring them. 
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Security found that screening was no more effective by April 2005 than before 
September 11, and in 2006 screeners failed twenty of the TSA’s twenty-two 
tests.28 GAO (2008) reported that covert tests through June 2007 conducted 
by the TSA’s Office of Inspection (OI) identified vulnerabilities in the com-
mercial aviation system at airports of all sizes. But the TSA apparently lacks 
a systematic process to ensure that the OI’s recommendations are appropri-
ately incorporated to improve airport security. 
Current  screening  procedures  are  also  inefficient.  The  annual  cost  of 
TSA security includes its budget of $5.5 billion, several billions of dollars in 
time costs incurred by passengers waiting to be screened, and $1.1 billion 
in lost revenue to airlines from reduced passenger volume at major airports 
(Blalock, Kadiyali, and Simon 2007). GAO (2009a) reports that the TSA 
spent more than $800 million on new air passenger screening technology 
between 2002 and 2008 but has not used any of it.
It is, of course, difficult to assess the benefits of TSA screening because 
we do not know of any terrorist attacks that screening has prevented. In any 
case, federal screeners have intercepted some 7 million prohibited items, but 
only six hundred were firearms while the rest were nail scissors, penknives, 
and the like.29 Those findings are consistent with many critics’ assessment 
of the TSA’s first-generation passenger and bag screening: it could stop 
most amateurs but not anyone seriously committed to bringing weapons 
or some type of explosive onto a plane. In December 2009 a Nigerian man 
succeeded in bringing explosive chemicals onto a Detroit-bound Northwest 
Airlines flight only to be foiled in his attempt to blow up the plane by his own 
incompetence and passengers’ actions. Homeland Security Secretary Janet 
Napolitano said the man was properly screened before getting on the flight 
to Detroit from Amsterdam.
The recent incident has illustrated the inefficiencies of expending billions 
of dollars in time and money to confiscate firearms—almost all of which 
were probably intended for recreational use—and of using Federal Air Mar-
shals. Stewart and Mueller (2008) conclude that it was far more cost-effective 
to put bulletproof doors on cockpits, which the airline industry did for some 
$300 million to $500 million.
Moreover, the incident suggests the importance of taking a risk-based 
approach  toward  security  that  would  be  better  targeted  toward  keeping 
28. Becky Akers, “A Better Way than the TSA,” Christian Science Monitor, March 21, 2007.
29. Anne Applebaum, “Airport Security’s Grand Illusion,” Washington Post, June 15, 2005, 
p. A25. 
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dangerous people off airplanes.30 To that end, greater efforts should be made 
to classify travelers according to their risk to airline passengers’ safety. Lower-
risk people would belong to a “trusted traveler” program and even supply 
fingerprints and other biometric data stored on smart chips to move quickly 
through security. Higher-risk people would be placed on an expanded list 
based on background investigations and intelligence work and would be 
subject to more intensive screening and, if necessary, to a full body search.31 
More rapid introduction of technologically advanced screening technolo-
gies would enhance the approach. For example, body-scanning technologies 
are more effective than metal detectors are at spotting potentially dangerous 
objects and substances and can do so with minimal radiation exposure. But 
the TSA has been very slow to introduce full-body scanners and they are just 
starting to be deployed.
A fundamental concern is whether the TSA should even exist. One alter-
native that is likely to be superior to the TSA on cost-benefit grounds is a 
variant of Israel’s model, where a branch of law enforcement receives addi-
tional funding and is responsible for identifying and questioning suspicious 
passengers. Initially the enforcement branch could be used at some selected 
airports, and its responsibilities and funding could be expanded if this strat-
egy was determined to be superior to using the TSA.
Private security firms that are not subject to federal regulations have been 
able to provide effective and subtle security for millions of customers at high-
risk facilities in the United States, such as casinos in Las Vegas and Atlantic 
City and major amusement parks such as Disney World. Private security 
firms could be hired at airports, not just to replace federal screeners with pri-
vate screeners but to develop security strategies and make safety investments 
to anticipate and respond to potential terrorist attacks—actions that private 
sector airport screeners did not take before September 11 when they were 
regulated by the government. Such firms could also be bonded, giving them 
strong financial incentives to provide effective security, and could interact 
with government law enforcement agencies as necessary.
It has also been claimed that government bureaucracy has discouraged 
research and development of new innovative solutions to combat terrorism, 
30. Robert Poole, “Are We Going to Get Serious about Aviation Security?” (Los Angeles: 
Reason Foundation, December 29, 2009). 
31. After a review of security at international airports following the attempt to blow up 
a jetliner bound for Detroit, President Obama approved using an intelligence-based security 
system to identify passengers who could have links to terrorism; see Jeff Zeleny, “Security Check 
System for Flights to U.S. to Be Altered,” New York Times, April 1, 2010. 
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causing a political disagreement over whether the government or the private 
sector should drive the development of security technology.32
Performance of Air Traffic Control
Today the probability of dying in a commercial aviation crash is at an all-
time low, following a dramatic improvement in safety during the past ten 
years.33 FAA expenditures on air traffic control deserve some credit for the 
nation’s improved safety record (Morrison and Winston 2008b); but the 
FAA’s inefficient pricing of and investment in the system and its slow adop-
tion of the latest technology have exacerbated air travel delays. In addition 
some observers in industry and academia caution that air transport safety 
could be threatened if the air traffic control system is not expeditiously 
upgraded to handle the expected growth in traffic over the next decade.
Pricing. The relevant consideration in pricing air traffic control ser-
vices is the marginal cost that a given flight imposes on the air traffic con-
trol system, including delay costs to other users. The cost clearly increases 
with the volume of traffic in a controller’s airspace. Because the ticket tax is 
based on a percentage of the price of a given flight that may or may not vary 
with the time of day and, incidentally, with air space congestion, it does not 
force a plane to account for the delays it imposes on other aircraft. In addi-
tion, because of the intensity of airline competition, real average fares have 
declined over time; thus, the ticket tax is not a stable source of revenue.
As air traffic controllers try to manage congested airspace near airports, 
delays may take the form of slower air speeds, indirect routings, suboptimal 
altitudes, and the like. Unscheduled aircraft (general aviation) may cause 
greater delays than scheduled aircraft cause because of unpredictable peaks 
in their demand for airspace, especially near airports, and because general 
aviation prefers altitude approach levels that create additional complexity for 
controllers. Those costs are also not reflected in the ticket tax.
I am not aware of any studies that quantify the welfare effects of replacing 
current air traffic control charges based on the ticket tax with appropriately 
measured marginal-cost user fees. The Congressional Budget Office (1992) 
reports rough estimates of the marginal cost of services provided by air traffic 
control. But because of data limitations, those estimates are based on the unre-
alistic assumption that all air traffic control facilities are optimized. Investment 
32. Dan Luzadder, “Airports, Tech Firms in Holding Pattern on New Security Systems,” 
Travel Weekly, November 8, 2006. 
33. In 1997 there was one fatal crash in the United States for every 2 million departures. 
After ten years of improvement in air safety, that ratio in 2006 was one fatal crash for every 4.5 
million departures. 
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in those facilities, however, has not been optimal. Under efficient (marginal-
cost) pricing and investment, air traffic control operations would likely be 
designed so that they exhaust any scale economies and fully cover costs.
A fundamental problem in determining efficient charges for air traffic 
control services is that the FAA has had historic difficulties in establishing 
their costs. In fact, Russell Chew, the former head of the FAA’s Air Traf-
fic Organization, which operates the air traffic system, acknowledged that, 
after extensive work by analysts, “an understanding of air traffic control 
costs is only now just coming.”34 In any case, I expect the efficiency gains 
from marginal-cost pricing, as reflected in reduced delay for travelers and 
lower operating costs for carriers, would be significant given that the ticket 
tax bears little relationship to the costs that an aircraft imposes on the system 
and on other aircraft and does little to discourage planes from using airspace 
near airports during congested periods. In addition, marginal-cost user fees 
would generate revenues that cover the costs of air traffic control services.
The expiration on September 30, 2007, of the taxes and fees that support 
the U.S. Airport and Airways Trust Fund and the trust fund’s reauthoriza-
tion provided an opportunity for the FAA and Congress to reconsider how 
the air traffic control system should be funded. Not surprisingly, input has 
been provided by the system’s users. Commercial airlines support user fees, 
instead of the ticket tax, because they believe that under this pricing scheme 
they will pay less for their use of air traffic control services and that business 
jets will pay more. The private- and corporate-jet owners prefer a fuel tax 
and argue that they should not pay higher fees because they cost the FAA 
less to handle than do the commercial airlines. Of course, general aviation 
planes that operate off-peak (for example, “weekend warriors” as opposed 
to business travelers) would pay little under congestion pricing for airspace. 
Instead of mediating the debate, the FAA should focus on how current pric-
ing inefficiencies are contributing to travel delays and develop a cost-based 
pricing scheme. As this chapter is being completed, the FAA reauthoriza-
tion bill has not been passed by Congress—funding has been provided by a 
series of short-term extensions—and the draft legislation that the House of 
Representatives and the Senate have crafted offer no improvements in the 
efficiency with which air traffic control is funded.
Investment. As noted, the FAA hires air traffic controllers and other air 
traffic control personnel and supplies terminal and en route facilities with new 
equipment. Personnel and equipment tend to be added to those parts of the 
34. Matthew L. Wald, “FAA Seeks New Source of Revenue in User Fees,” New York Times, 
March 7, 2006.
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system where traffic levels exceed a threshold. The FAA’s allocation of funds 
is also influenced by airlines, airports, trade associations, and members of 
Congress, a process that may compromise the efficiency of FAA investments.
Morrison and Winston (2008b) document at least one way that FAA 
investments could be improved. Compared with the current allocation, they 
find that allocating expenditures to towers and TRACONs serving airports 
where travelers incur the most costly delays would generate more than $1 
billion in annual time savings to air travelers and cost savings to airlines. 
Under the current allocation, smaller airports get a disproportionately large 
share of funds, an allocation that appears to be zealously protected by repre-
sentatives of the districts where the airports are located. For example, Oster 
and Strong (2006) point out that when the Air Traffic Organization pro-
posed in February 2005 to close control towers between midnight and 5:00 
a.m. at forty-eight lightly used airports, U.S. legislators from the airports’ 
districts strongly opposed the action without considering whether the tower 
services were needed or even used.
Robyn (2007) finds that, despite the FAA’s investments to modernize air 
traffic control technology, controller productivity (as measured by instru-
ment-flight-rule operations per controller) has not improved during the past 
twenty-five years, and production costs have grown significantly. Productiv-
ity could have improved if many of the routine tasks that controllers perform 
were performed by new hardware and software. For example, it is possible 
and desirable to automate the handoff of a flight from one sector to another, 
especially because this task accounts for a large share of all air-to-ground 
communications.
Technology Adoption. The FAA could also reduce delays by expe-
ditiously implementing technologies that have the capability of expanding 
navigable airspace around airports and en route. I have indicated that the 
FAA has yet to fully adopt the air traffic control technology that was envi-
sioned when the advanced automated system was initiated during the early 
1980s. Worse, the technology is no longer state of the art. By enabling pilots 
to be less dependent on controllers and to choose the most efficient altitude, 
routing, and speed for their trip, the NextGen satellite-based system could 
reduce air travel times and carrier operating costs, especially those related to 
fuel, and handle more traffic while maintaining, if not improving upon, the 
nation’s air transportation safety record. In fact, the NextGen system would 
facilitate the first significant change from the air traffic routes established 
in the 1920s, when the government was developing airmail service. Today’s 
pilots, while flying at much higher altitudes than they did several decades 
ago, still follow the same routes.
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Unfortunately, the delays that the FAA has experienced with implement-
ing experimental satellite-based systems suggest that NextGen will take more 
than the projected twenty-five years to become fully operational and that the 
current system may eventually have to impose additional delays on aircraft to 
handle growing traffic volumes safely. The GAO has concluded that the FAA 
has failed to provide the expertise to make the transition to NextGen and has 
urged it to seek assistance from a third party.35 Calvin L. Scovel III (2008), 
the inspector general of the DOT, has identified concerns that the FAA is not 
properly organized to manage or execute a multibillion-dollar effort. Scovel 
recently told a congressional panel that the En Route Automation Moderniza-
tion computer system, a critical underpinning of NextGen, has run into seri-
ous problems that will delay deployment of the new air traffic control system.36
Finally, all the facilities associated with the current system will eventually 
be eliminated or consolidated as NextGen is managed and operated with 
fewer and more technologically up-to-date facilities. Such disinvestment and 
consolidation will undoubtedly face political resistance that slows the imple-
mentation of NextGen because members of Congress will attempt to keep 
current navigational aids and jobs in their districts.37
Summary and Conclusions
Air travelers in the United States have never been safer—and they have never 
suffered such long delays on their flights. As summarized in table 5-2, inef-
ficient pricing and investment policies toward airports and air traffic control 
have significantly contributed to delays that are costly to travelers and carri-
ers.38 Travelers and carriers are also harmed by federal agencies’ slow adoption 
of technologies and practices to improve security and air traffic control, while 
other inefficient airport policies have reduced competition and raised fares.
Despite air transportation’s strong safety record, Representative James 
Oberstar, chairman of the House Transportation Committee, has recently 
criticized the FAA for allowing a “carrier-favorable, cozy relationship” to 
set in—raising concerns that the agency may be compromising safety. Such 
35. “FAA Urged to Seek Help with NGATS,” Flight International, August 1, 2006. 
36. Joan Lowy, “Problems Plague New Air Traffic Control Computers,” Associated Press, 
April 22, 2010.
37. David Hughes, “FAA Accelerates Performance-Based Navigation, Outlines Mandates,” 
Aviation Week, July 30, 2006; Dick Armey, “Fixing the Air Traffic Mess,” Wall Street Journal, 
August 20, 2007. 
38. Inclement weather, which policymakers cannot control, also contributes to travelers’ 
delays. But its effect interacts with carriers’ operations, airports’ runway capacities, and the like. 
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concerns are greatly exaggerated, especially because the market and the lia-
bility system provide strong incentives for air carriers to behave in a socially 
beneficial manner. In addition, because the airlines and aircraft manufactur-
ers know far more about aircraft technology and airline operations than the 
FAA does, FAA air safety regulations do not appear to be indispensable.39 If 
privatization of aviation infrastructure would not compromise air safety, it 
would be worthwhile to explore whether it could reduce the inefficiencies of 
the national aviation system.
39. Dominic Gates, “FAA Lets Aerospace Firms Certify Safety of Their Products,” Seattle 
Times, September 2, 2008, reports on a new regulatory program where certain manufacturers 
have been approved by the FAA to self-certify the safety of their products.
Table 5-2.  Aviation Infrastructure Policies and Their Inefficiencies 
Policy Inefficiency
Airport runway pricing Weight-based landing fees undercharge aircraft for their 
contribution to delays during peak periods, increasing 
travelers’delay costs and airlines’ operating costs.
Airport slot controls  
to limit operations
Slot controls have tended to reduce competition and  
raise fares.
Airport runway  
investment
Regulatory hurdles significantly increase the time and cost 
to build new runways and extend existing runways, 
which could reduce delays.
Airport gate utilization Limited availability of gates reduces competition and  
raises fares.
Airport security Screening procedures could be implemented at much lower 
cost and cause  travelers much shorter delays.
Air traffic control  
pricing
The ticket tax does not vary with air space congestion; thus 
aircraft are undercharged for their contribution to delays, 
which increase travelers’ delay costs and airlines’ operat-
ing costs.
Air traffic control 
investments
Funds for air traffic control facilities are not allocated to 
minimize delay costs, which forfeits potential savings 
to travelers and carriers.
Air traffic control  
technology adoption
The FAA does not adopt new technologies in an efficient, 
expeditious manner, thus increasing the costs of the 
system and preventing users from incurring lower 
delay costs.
Source: Author.
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LAST EXIT
Privatization and Deregulation of 
the U.S. Transportation System
In Last Exit Clifford Winston reminds us that transportation services and infra-
structure in the United States were originally introduced by private firms. The
case for subsequent public ownership and management of the system was
weak, in his view, and here he assesses the case for privatization and deregu-
lation to greatly improve Americans’ satisfaction with their transportation
  systems.
“A half-century of economics research, much of it from Brookings, convincingly
shows that deregulation of transportation services delivered enormous benefits.
Last Exit argues persuasively that these benefits are limited by continuing pub-
lic provision of infrastructure and regulation or public provision of some services.
Clifford Winston proposes experiments in private provision of airports, high-
ways, and urban passenger transportation, and more efficient usage pricing for
infrastructure, to test the strong theoretical case for increasing the scope of pri-
vatization and deregulation. These provocative but measured proposals provide
the agenda for a serious national debate on the next steps in reforming trans-
portation policy.”—Roger Noll, Stanford University
“Clifford Winston offers a blueprint for increasing the role of the private sector
in providing U.S. transportation infrastructure. He makes the case that public
sector exit can improve economic efficiency, speed technological advance, and
help solve current fiscal pressures.”—Betsy Bailey, University of Pennsylvania
“Winston pulls together the first comprehensive accounting of the many ineffi-
ciencies that arise from current public policies in transportation. The bill—
amounting to $100 billion per year plus reduced innovation—will hopefully
stimulate some of the experiments he advocates with increased private provi-
sion of transportation.”—Tony Gomez-Ibanez, Harvard University
Clifford Winston is a senior fellow in Economic Studies at the Brookings
  Institution. His previous books include Aviation Infrastructure Performance and
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